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LETTER DATED 25 JANUARY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of my Government, I request that you distribute as documents of the Security Council the enclosed text of the briefing conducted by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States on 23 January 1991 concerning the Crisis in the Gulf.

(Signed) Thomas R. PICKERING

Annex

FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSCRIPT OF A NEWS BRIEFING CONDUCTED BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DICK CHENEY AND GENERAL COLIN POWELL, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AT THE PENTAGON ON WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23, 1991 AT 2 P.M.:

MR. PETE WILLIAMS, ASD(PUBLIC AFFAIRS): GOOD AFTERNOON, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. SECRETARY CHENEY AND GENERAL POWELL ARE HERE TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS. THE SECRETARY WILL HAVE A SHORT STATEMENT, THEN GENERAL POWELL WILL WALK YOU THROUGH -. WE'LL HAVE SOME CHARTS HERE. AFTER THE BRIEFINGS ARE OVER THE CHARTS WILL REMAIN HERE SO THAT YOU CAN PHOTOGRAPH THEM. WE WILL TRY, THIS AFTERNOON, TO PROVIDE YOU SMALLER HANDCUTS OF THOSE. SO LET ME, AT THIS POINT, TURN IT OVER TO THE SECRETARY.

SECRETARY CHENEY: THANK YOU VERY MUCH, PETE.

OPERATION DESERT STORM HAS NOW BEEN UNDERWAY FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK, AS OF THIS EVENING. WE BELIEVE THAT IT'S GONE VERY WELL. WE WANTED TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO PUT THINGS IN PERSPECTIVE, AND THEN TRY TO RESPOND TO SOME OF YOUR QUESTIONS. LET ME BEGIN BY EXPRESSING THE PRIDE THAT WE ALL FEEL IN THE MEN AND WOMEN OF OUR ARMED FORCES WHO ARE CARRYING OUT THESE OPERATIONS. IT IS AN EXTREMELY COMPLEX AND OFTEN DANGEROUS UNDERTAKING, AND THEY HAVE OUR ADMIRATION AND OUR GRATITUDE. I ALSO WANT TO SAY TO THE FAMILIES OF THOSE HELD PRISONER OR MISSING IN ACTION, THAT THEY ARE IN THE PRAYERS OF ALL AMERICANS IN THESE VERY DIFFICULT DAYS.

I WANT TO REPEAT WHAT WE TOLD ALL OF YOU LAST WEEK AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS CONFLICT. I URGED CAUTION IN DESCRIBING THE EVENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, ESPECIALLY IN CLAIMING VICTORY TOO SOON. THE NEXT DAY, THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN ABOUT WHAT HE CALLED THE INITIAL EUPHORIA AND SOME OF THE EARLY REACTIONS AND STORIES ABOUT THE OPERATION.

I ALSO SAID THAT THIS OPERATION WAS LIKELY TO RUN FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. YESTERDAY, WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM IN ITS SIXTH DAY, I NOTICED A NEWSPAPER HEADLINE WHICH SAID, "WAR DRAGS ON." FINALLY, THIS MORNING, I NOTICED THAT THE STYLE SECTION IN THE WASHINGTON POST HAD THREE SEPARATE STORIES ABOUT THE PRESS COVERING THE WAR IN THE GULF. AS AN OLD WASHINGTON HAND, I KNOW THAT HAVING THE PRESS REPORTING ON THE PRESS REPORTING ON A STORY IS USUALLY A SIGN THAT THEY'VE RUN OUT OF THINGS TO SAY ABOUT THIS WAR. SO COLIN AND I DECIDED TO SPEND A LITTLE TIME WITH YOU THIS AFTERNOON TO SEE IF WE COULD GIVE YOU SOME NEW INFORMATION. SOME IMPORTANT QUALIFIERS TO KEEP IN MIND AS WE GO THROUGH THE BRIEFING THIS AFTERNOON -, AND MANY OF THESE MAY BE OBVIOUS, BUT I THINK NEED TO BE RESTATED. THE IRAQIS AND SADDAM HUSSEIN HAVE A VERY LARGE MILITARY FORCE. DEPENDING UPON WHAT CRITERIA YOU USE, CERTAINLY ONE OF THE LARGEST IN THE WORLD -. SOME HAVE SAID THE FOURTH LARGEST IN THE WORLD. IN THE LAST DECADE HE'S SPENT OVER \$50 BILLION ON ARMAMENTS. THE FORCE POSSESSES THOUSANDS OF TANKS, HUNDREDS OF AIRCRAFT, OVER A MILLION MEN IN UNIFORM, MISSILES, ETCETERA.

IN THE KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS -, IN KUWAIT AND SOUTHERN IRAQ, THERE ARE OVER 120 BRIGADES AND SOME 30, PLUS DIVISIONS DUG IN IN THAT AREA. I DON'T THINK ANYONE HERE EXPECTED THAT WE WOULD GET RID OF ALL THAT CAPABILITY WITHIN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE OPERATION. OVER 10,000 SEPARATE SORTIES HAVE BEEN FLOWN ON COMBAT AND SUPPORT MISSIONS IN JUST THE PAST SEVEN DAYS. OUR GOAL REMAINS THE SAME -. TO LIBERATE KUWAIT BY FORCING SADDAM HUSSEIN OUT. TO DO THAT, WE HAVE TO WEAKEN HIS MILITARY FORCE.

AND TO GO AFTER HIS OFFENSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY. IN PURSUIT OF THAT OBJECTIVE, WE BEGAN BY CONCENTRATING ON A CAREFULLY PLANNED SET OF MILITARY TARGETS THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO HIT OVER THE COURSE OF THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS AND WEEKS. WE'VE STARTED WITH COMMAND AND CONTROL, WITH HIS COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES, HIS AIR DEFENSE UNITS AND RADARS, HIS AIRFIELDS, HIS SCUD MISSILE LAUNCHERS. WE'VE GONE AFTER THE FACTORIES WHERE IRAQ HAS PRODUCED CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, AND UNTIL RECENTLY, CONTINUED WORKING ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE'VE ALSO GONE AFTER THE MAINSTAY OF SADDAM'S COMMAND FORCES, THE REPUBLICAN GUARD UNITS LOCATED NEAR THE IRAQI/KUWAITI BORDER. ALL OF THESE TARGETS WE CHOSE IN ADVANCE.

THE PILOTS OF THE ALLIED AIR FORCES HAVE OPERATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS TO LAUNCH WEAPONS ONLY WHEN THEY ARE CERTAIN THEY'VE SELECTED THE RIGHT TARGETS UNDER CORRECT CONDITIONS. IRAQ, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS CHOSEN TO LAUNCH A HIGHLY INACCURATE WEAPON -- THE SCUD MISSILE -- AT MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS, WITH NO CERTAINTY ABOUT WHERE THE SCUDS WILL LAND. IN CONTRAST, WE HAVE CAREFULLY CHOSEN OUR TARGETS AND WE'VE BOMBED THEM WITH PRECISION.

BASED ON THE REPORTS WE'RE GETTING FROM OUR PILOTS AND THE EVIDENCE OF GUN CAMERA RECORDINGS, MANY OF WHICH YOU'VE SEEN, THE BOMBING MISSIONS ARE GOING WELL. THE MISSIONS ARE BASED ON THE TARGET LIST DRAWN UP BEFORE THE OPERATION STARTED. AT THE SAME TIME, WE'VE BEEN EAGER TO KNOW ABOUT THE KIND OF DAMAGE WHICH WE'VE BEEN ABLE TO CAUSE. THAT'S WHY WE DO BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. THESE ASSESSMENTS ARE NOW COMING IN AND WILL BE USED TO MAKE JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS TO DATE, AND TO GUIDE THE PLANNING OF FUTURE OPERATIONS.

I WANT TO CAUTION YOU, AGAIN, THAT A MILITARY OPERATION OF THIS INTENSITY AND COMPLEXITY CANNOT BE SCORED EVERY EVENING LIKE A COLLEGE TRACK MEET OR A BASKETBALL TOURNAMENT. I KNOW HOW HARD IT IS FOR YOU TO COVER THIS KIND OF AN OPERATION WHEN YOU CANNOT SEE WHAT'S GOING ON INSIDE IRAQ OR OCCUPIED KUWAIT. SOME OF YOU HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF US FOR NOT PUTTING INFORMATION OUT MORE QUICKLY -- I UNDERSTAND YOUR POINT, BUT WE WANT TO BE CERTAIN THAT WE DON'T RUSH DOWN HERE WITH PREMATURE WORDS OF SUCCESS. WE ARE DELIBERATELY WAITING UNTIL WE HAVE SOME CONFIDENCE IN THE RESULTS OF SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF TARGETS. THAT MAY WELL NOT FIT THE 24-HOUR CYCLE THAT YOU'RE USED TO, BUT WE WANT TO HAVE CONFIDENCE IN WHAT WE ARE SAYING BEFORE WE SAY IT.

TWO FINAL POINTS: THERE MAY WELL BE SURPRISES AHEAD FOR US. NO ONE SHOULD ASSUME THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN DOES NOT HAVE SIGNIFICANT REMAINING MILITARY CAPABILITY. WE HAVE TO ANTICIPATE THAT HE WILL TRY TO USE THAT AGAINST US AND OUR ALLIES. WE HAVE TO ASSUME THAT HE MAY SEEK TO LAUNCH AIR STRIKES AND MORE SCUDS, OR HIT OIL FIELDS, OR GENERATE TERRORIST ATTACKS. HE IS A MAN WHO WILL USE ANY MEANS AT HIS DISPOSAL TO BREAK UP THE COALITION AND TO AVOID DEFEAT, BUT HE CANNOT CHANGE THE BASIC COURSE OF THE CONFLICT. HE WILL BE DEFEATED.

OUR FIRST OBLIGATION HERE IN THE PENTAGON IS TO CARRY OUT THE AND TO GO AFTER HIS OFFENSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY. IN PURSUIT OF PRESIDENT'S ORDERS, AND TO WIN THE WAR. WE MUST ALSO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO DO IT IN A MANNER THAT HOLDS AMERICAN AND

ALLIED CASUALTIES TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM. WE RECOGNIZE THAT WE ALSO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF OUR EFFORTS TO THE PRESS. WE WILL DO THAT. BUT YOU, THE MEMBERS OF THE PRESS, HAVE TO UNDERSTAND THAT FIRST AND FOREMOST WE MUST SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF FUTURE OPERATIONS, AND TO PROTECT THE LIVES OF THOSE WHO WILL BE ASKED TO CARRY THEM OUT.

WITH THAT, I'D LIKE TO TURN THE BRIEFING OVER TO MY COLLEAGUE, COLIN POWELL, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS, WITH A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE STATUS OF THE OPERATION TO DATE.

GENERAL POWELL: THANK YOU, MR. SECRETARY. LET ME ALSO EXPRESS MY PRIDE, AND I EXPECT IT'S THE PRIDE OF ALL AMERICANS, AT THE PROFESSIONALISM WITH WHICH THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE ARMED FORCES HAVE CARRIED OUT THIS OPERATION SO FAR; AND OF COURSE, I SHARE THE SECRETARY'S CONCERN ABOUT OUR MISSING IN ACTION, AND OUR PRAYERS ARE WITH THE FAMILIES OF THOSE WHO HAVE LOST LOVED ONES, AND ESPECIALLY WITH THE FAMILIES OF THOSE WHO DO HAVE MISSING IN ACTION WHO MAY WELL BE PRISONERS OF WAR.

THIS IS THE END OF THE FIRST WEEK OF OPERATIONS. WHAT I'D LIKE TO DO IS FOR A FEW MOMENTS TAKE STOCK WITH YOU, AND ATTEMPT TO DAMPEN OUT THE OSCILLATIONS BETWEEN EUPHORIA AND DISTRESS THAT SOMETIMES CATCHES US UP EVERY HOUR ON THE HOUR. I'D LIKE TO DO THAT BY FIRST REMINDING YOU OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE THAT WE SET OUT TO ACCOMPLISH, AND THAT IS SIMPLY TO EJECT THE IRAQI ARMY FROM KUWAIT. ALL OF OUR ACTIVITIES MUST ULTIMATELY SUPPORT THIS FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY OBJECTIVE. OF COURSE WHEN WE ACHIEVE THAT OBJECTIVE, WE THEN WILL BE IN A POSITION TO RESTORE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT AND PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE REGION.

WE ALSO REMIND YOU ONCE AGAIN, AS WE'VE SAID HERE PREVIOUSLY, THIS IS AN AIR/LAND/SEA CAMPAIGN, - NOT JUST AN AIR CAMPAIGN WHICH AT SOME POINT WILL END, AND THEN SOMETHING ELSE STARTS. IT IS A SINGLE, COHERENT, INTEGRATED AIR/LAND/SEA CAMPAIGN. THE CAMPAIGN PLAN HAS EXECUTED, SO FAR, PRETTY MUCH AS WE HAVE EXPECTED, WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS. THE WEATHER TURNED MORE SEVERE AFTER TWO AND A HALF DAYS OF OPERATION THAN WE HAD EXPECTED. WE KNEW WE WERE GOING TO HAVE TWO AND A HALF DAYS, AND THEN WE THOUGHT WE'D LOSE A DAY OR TWO TO WEATHER CONDITIONS, BUT THOSE WEATHER CONDITIONS WERE MORE SEVERE THAN WE EXPECTED WHEN THEY FINALLY HIT, WHEN THE FRONT CAME IN, AND LASTED A LITTLE BIT LONGER THAN WE EXPECTED. AS A RESULT, A NUMBER OF OUR PLANNED MISSIONS HAD TO BE ABORTED, THE BDA PROCESS HAS BEEN BEHIND SCHEDULE BECAUSE OF CLOUD COVER AND OTHER WEATHER PROBLEMS, AND WE HAVE HAD TO CANCEL SOME TARGET COVERAGE. ALL THIS MEANS IS THAT WE HAVE TO MAKE THAT UP, OVER TIME, BUT WE ARE STILL, ESSENTIALLY, ON OUR ORIGINAL GAME PLAN.

THE OTHER POINT I MIGHT MAKE IS THAT WE DEVOTED MORE EFFORT THAN WE INITIALLY THOUGHT WE MIGHT HAVE TO GO AFTER THE SCUD TARGETS THAT YOU HAVE REPORTED ON SO MUCH IN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS. MOBILE SCUDS WERE THE PROBLEM THAT WE HAD ANTICIPATED THEY WOULD BE, AND NOW THAT WE ARE INTO IT, AND I'LL SAY MORE ABOUT SCUDS LATER, WE ARE FINDING THAT IT'S TAKING MORE OF AN EFFORT ON OUR PART TO GO AFTER THOSE SCUDS THAN WE HAD ANTICIPATED. BUT NOTWITHSTANDING THESE SORTS OF PROBLEMS, WE'RE PLEASED WITH WEEK ONE, AND WE ARE SATISFIED THAT THE CONTRIBUTION THAT THE STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGN IS MAKING TO OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVE IS A GOOD CONTRIBUTION, AND IS ABOUT WHAT WE EXPECTED.

WHAT I'D LIKE TO DO IS DISCUSS CERTAIN PARTS OF THE AIR PHASE OF

THE CAMPAIGN AND THE RESULTS WE'VE ACHIEVED IN AN EFFORT TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HOW ARE WE DOING --, HOW EFFECTIVE HAS THE OPERATION BEEN SO FAR. LET ME FIRST START TALKING ABOUT THE AIR-TO-AIR PART OF THE CAMPAIGN. HOW IT'S BEEN GOING WITH RESPECT TO U.S. AIR FORCES ENGAGED IN AERIAL COMBAT WITH IRAQI AIR FORCES.

IRAQI AIR-TO-AIR INTERCEPTION, TO DATE, HAS BEEN, FOR THE MOST PART, TOTALLY INEFFECTIVE. IN AIR-TO-AIR ENGAGEMENTS, THE RESULTS ARE 19 IRAQI INTERCEPTORS DESTROYED IN AERIAL COMBAT; AND WE BELIEVE THE MOST WE MIGHT HAVE LOST IS ONE. WE WERE CARRYING IT AS ZERO UNTIL EARLIER TODAY WHEN WE DID SOME MORE ANALYSIS, TALKED WITH SOME PILOTS, AND ONE OF OUR PLANES MAY HAVE BEEN HIT IN AIR-TO-AIR ENGAGEMENT. SO AT BEST, 19,0; AT WORST, AT THE MOMENT, 19,1. THEIR LOSSES, IN THE INTERCEPTOR CATEGORY, HAVE ALL BEEN F-1'S AND MIG-29'S, THEIR FIRST LINE INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT. OTHER LOSSES THAT THEY HAVE SUSTAINED RAISE THEIR TOTAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT LOSSES TO SOMETHING IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF 41. BUT THE REAL MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS, THE REAL WAY TO LOOK AT THIS AND MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WE'RE DOING, IS NOT BY THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT DOWNED OR HOW MANY SORTIES WE'VE FLOWN OR HOW MANY BUNKERS WE'VE HIT AND HOW MANY BOMBS WE'VE DROPPED -- THE REAL MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS IS WHAT HAS THE IRAQI AIR FORCE BEEN ABLE TO DO TO INTERFERE WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM? THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT AFTER A ONE WEEK PERIOD OF TIME, NO IRAQI AIRPLANE HAS CONDUCTED A SINGLE GROUND ATTACK AGAINST ANY COALITION TARGET; AND WITH THE ONE EXCEPTION OF PERHAPS THE ONE AIRPLANE THAT MAY HAVE GONE DOWN, THE IRAQI AIR FORCE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO INTERFERE WITH OUR AIR OPERATION.

WHEN YOU CONSIDER THAT THE IRAQI AIR FORCE HAD A MASSIVE AMOUNT OF MONEY AND RESOURCES INVESTED INTO IT OVER THE YEARS, AND HAS SOME 800 FIGHTER BOMBERS AND INTERCEPTORS, I THINK IT'S FAIR TO SAY THAT THIS HAS NOT BEEN, SO FAR, A VERY GOOD RETURN ON THE INVESTMENT THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS PUT INTO THE AIR FORCE. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS A LARGE AIR FORCE. IT HAS A LATENT CAPABILITY. IT HAS THE ABILITY TO CONDUCT DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IF THEY CAN EVER GET THEIR ACT TOGETHER. BUT AS YOU WILL SEE IN THE COURSE OF THE BRIEFING, THEIR SORTIE RATE IS DOWN, AND THEIR ABILITY TO OPERATE HAS PRETTY MUCH BEEN COM-
STRAINED.

BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATION, THIS MAP -- FOR THOSE OF YOU WHO WISH TO COUNT THE LITTLE DOTS, THERE ARE 66 LITTLE DOTS, AND THEY REFLECT MAIN OPERATING BASES IN RED, DISPERSAL AIRFIELDS IN BLUE, AND THEN THE GENERAL SCUD LAUNCH AREAS FROM THE WEST OUT TO ISRAEL AND FROM THE EAST DOWN SOUTH INTO RIYADH, ARE SHOWN BY THE BLACK HATCHED MARKS.

THIS IS A VERY EXTENSIVE AIRFIELD SYSTEM -- HARDENED BUNKERS, YOU'VE SEEN PICTURES OF THEM; UNDERGROUND COMMAND AND CONTROL INSTALLATIONS; HARDENED FUEL FACILITIES; HARDENED AMMO FACILITIES. BUT THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS, THAT AFTER ONE WEEK OF OPERATION, WE ARE NOT BEING CHALLENGED BY THIS AIR FORCE; AND IN FACT, WITHIN THE LAST 24 HOURS WE HAVE ONLY SEEN ACTIVITY AT THE

AIR BASES THAT YOU SEE BEING POINTED OUT TO YOU WITH A LITTLE YELLOW DOT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE RED. THOSE ARE THE ONLY ONES THAT HAVE SHOWN ANY ACTIVE WORK IN THE LAST 24 HOURS.

IF I CAN TURN TO THIS CHART, JUST TO GIVE YOU ANOTHER ILLUSTRATION... THIS SUMMARIZES WHAT I SAID EARLIER, 411 INTERCEPTORS, 398 FIGHTER BOMBERS, 809 TOTAL; KILLED 19 IN AERIAL COMBAT, ANOTHER 22 CONFIRMED KILLED ON THE GROUND, FOR A TOTAL OF 41 IN THIS CATEGORY. THEY HAVE A LOT OF OTHER KINDS OF AIRCRAFT THAT COULD RUN THIS TOTAL UP TO ROUGHLY 1400 IF YOU ADD IN TRANSPORTS AND HELICOPTERS AND THINGS OF THAT NATURE, BUT FOR THE COMBAT CATEGORY, THE THING THAT WE WORRY ABOUT, THIS IS THE NUMBER. I'M NOT REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS NUMBER FOR THE MOMENT. THEY ARE, FOR THE MOST PART, ON THE GROUND, IN HARDENED SHELTERS, TRYING TO HIDE AND SURVIVE. IN DUE COURSE, THEY MAY WISH TO COME OUT AND CHALLENGE US, OR THEY JUST MAY TRY TO RIDE IT OUT FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. THESE NUMBERS WILL RISE OVER TIME AS WE CONTINUE THE CAMPAIGN TO GO AFTER SHELTERS, GO AFTER BUNKERS AND ESSENTIALLY RIP UP THE AIR FORCE IN ITS ENTIRETY. LET ME TURN NOW TO ANOTHER PART OF THE AIR BATTLE, AND THAT HAS TO DO WITH GROUND-TO-SURFACE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS -- THE SAMs AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS. THIS CHART REFLECTS, AT A HIGH LEVEL OF AGGREGATION BECAUSE I DON'T WANT TO GIVE AWAY TOO MUCH INFORMATION, BUT THE MAIN AIR DEFENSE SAM BELTS IN RED CIRCLES, AND THEN THE CIRCLES GOING ALL AROUND THE COUNTRY REFLECT THEIR EARLY WARNING CAPABILITY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE OPERATION. AN EXTREMELY LARGE, SOPHISTICATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM, PRINCIPALLY WITH SOVIET EQUIPMENT, SOVIET MISSILE EQUIPMENT, SOME FRENCH, SOME U.S. THAT WAS CAPTURED, AS WELL AS A VERY COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF TRYING TO INTEGRATE ALL OF THOSE MISSILE SYSTEMS AND GUN SYSTEMS. HARDENED COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTERS AROUND THE COUNTRY. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS, THAT WE WERE ABLE TO ATTACK THIS AIR DEFENSE ENVELOPE WITH GREAT SUCCESS OVER THE LAST WEEK BY FIRST TAKING OUT THE EARLY WARNING CAPABILITY, BLINDING THEM, AND THEN GOING AFTER THE OPERATING CENTERS, THE VARIOUS SECTOR OPERATING CENTERS THAT THEY USED TO WIRE THIS ALL TOGETHER. FOR THE MOST PART, WE HAVE NOT BEEN SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY THIS VERY LARGE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. WE HAVE HAD A TOTAL OF 10 AIRCRAFT LOST, AS YOU KNOW. AS WE GO THROUGH THE ANALYSIS OF HOW WE LOST THOSE AIRCRAFT, AT THE MOMENT IT APPEARS WE LOST TWO BY SAM FIRE, SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE FIRE, AND THREE MORE BY GROUND FIRE (AAA), AND THE OTHER FIVE WE'RE STILL TAKING A LOOK AT. BUT WHEN YOU TAKE A LOOK AT OUR TOTAL LOSSES OF ONLY TEN U.S. AIRCRAFT, AND I'LL SHOW YOU A CHART THERE THAT, WELL THIS SAYS SAM 1, AAA 3, I HAD IT THE OTHER WAY AROUND, BUT IT'S SOMETHING CLOSE TO THAT, AND I APOLOGIZE FOR THE DIFFERENCE IN NUMBERS. WHEN YOU TAKE A LOOK AT THE TOTAL OF 16 AIRCRAFT LOSSES FOR THE COALITION IN ITS ENTIRETY, AND YOU CONSIDER THE NUMBER OF COMBAT SORTIES THAT HAVE BEEN FLOW, AND THE NUMBERS OF SINGLE AIRCRAFT THAT ARE INVOLVED IN THIS OPERATION, SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 1,000-2,000 AIRCRAFT, THIS IS A VERY LOW LOSS RATE FOR AN OPERATION OF THIS TYPE. PUTTING ALL THAT TOGETHER, WE CAN CONCLUDE THAT ALLIED AIR FORCES HAVE ACHIEVED AIR SUPERIORITY OVER NOT ONLY THE KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS, BUT THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE THEATER, TO INCLUDE IRAQ. WE CAN DEBATE WHETHER IT'S AIR SUPERIORITY AS DEFINED BY AMERICAN DOCTRINE, OR AIR SUPREMACY AS SOME OF MY BRITISH COLLEAGUES HAVE ALLUDED, OR LOCAL AIR SUPERIORITY AS SOME OF MY FRIENDS IN RIYADH SAY -- I USED TO TEACH THE SUBJECT, I OWN THE JCS PUBLICATION THAT HAS THE DEFINITION IN IT -- WHICH I HELPED WRITE WHEN I WAS A CAPTAIN -- AND I CAN ASSURE YOU, THAT THIS

QUALIFIES FOR THE DEFINITION OF AIR SUPERIORITY. WHEN YOU CAN OPERATE IN AN UNHINDERED WAY, AS WE HAVE BEEN OPERATING, OVER AN AREA LIKE THIS AGAINST AN AIR FORCE THAT SIZE, AND WITH AN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM THAT SDPHISTICATED, WE HAVE ACHIEVED AIR SUPERIOR, ITTY.

THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT A YOUNG PILOT WHO IS TAKING OFF WILL SAY POWELL SAYS WE HAVE AIR SUPERIORITY, I'VE GOT NOTHING TO WORRY ABOUT. NOT AT ALL. WE'RE DEALING WITH AN ENEMY THAT IS RESOURCEFUL, AN ENEMY THAT KNOWS HOW TO WORK AROUND PROBLEMS, AN ENEMY THAT IS INGENIOUS. YOU CAN BE SURE THAT WHILE WE'RE HERE TODAY, THEY'RE IN BAGHDAD TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WORK AROUNDS, TRYING TO DETERMINE WHERE THEIR WEAKNESSES ARE, AND SEE IF THEY HAVE CAPABILITY TO FIX THOSE WEAKNESSES. EVERY PILOT THAT GOES AGAINST THIS ENVIRONMENT, STILL HAS TO BE CONCERNED THAT HE IS GOING AGAINST AN ENVIRONMENT THAT HAS THE POTENTIAL OF TAKING DOWN HIS AIRPLANE. SO WE ARE NOT GETTING COMPLACENT, WE ARE NOT WRITING THIS OFF, PUT IN TERMS OF HOW IT LOOKS AT GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF'S LEVEL AND AT MY LEVEL, WE HAVE AIR SUPERIORITY. WITH THAT AIR SUPERIORITY, WE CAN NOW BEGIN TO USE OUR AIR FORCES TO SIMPLY MAINTAIN THIS SUPERIORITY AND START TO CONCENTRATE DOWN CLOSER TO THE KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS, REMEMBERING ONCE AGAIN, OUR MILITARY OBJECTIVE IS THE IRAQI ARMY IN KUWAIT. WE HAVE FREE RUN OF THE AREA, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. THERE WILL STILL BE LOSSES, AND I DON'T WANT TO UNDERSTATE THAT, BUT IN GENERAL, AIR SUPERIORITY.

ANY PILOT WILL TELL YOU, THOUGH, THAT THE REAL DANGER IS GUNS. AS WE GET CLOSER INTO THE KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS AND OUR OP TEMPO PICKS UP, WE WILL FOCUS A GREAT DEAL OF OUR ATTENTION ON KNOCKING DOWN THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN THREAT TO OUR PILOTS SO THEY CAN GET EVEN LOWER AND MAKE THEIR STRIKES MORE EFFECTIVE AS WE GO AFTER DISCREET UNITS ON THE GROUND IN DUE COURSE. BEFORE TURNING TO THE IRAQI ARMY, LET ME BE TOTALLY JOINT AND SAY A WORD ABOUT THE IRAQI NAVY, A NAVY OF ALMOST NO CAPABILITY, OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF PATROL BOATS. WE HAVE DESTROYED SEVERAL OF THOSE PATROL BOATS. WE HAVE TAKEN OUT A SILKWORM SITE THEY WERE MANNING. WE HAVE ALSO SUNK, OR SEVERELY DAMAGED --, IT ISN'T SUNK, IN FACT IT IS FLOATING -- SEVERELY DAMAGED A SHIP THEY HAVE BEEN USING TO LAY MINES. ALSO WITHIN THE LAST WEEK, WE HAVE DESTROYED A NUMBER OF THE MINES --, I THINK THE COUNT IS 24 OF THE MINES THAT HAVE BEEN FLOATING FREE IN THE PERSIAN GULF. SO I THINK WE'VE DEALT WITH THE MINE THREAT FOR THE MOMENT, AND IN DUE COURSE, IF THE IRAQI NAVY IN SOME WAY DECIDES TO COME OUT ANY MORE AND CHALLENGE US WITH THESE MINOR AND INSIGNIFICANT PATROL BOATS, IT IS, INDEED, A MANAGEABLE THREAT.

LET ME TURN NOW, TO THE IRAQI ARMY IN THE KUWAIT THEATER OF OPERATIONS. AS THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT, THIS IS A LARGE, COMBINED ARMS ARMY. IT HAS TANKS, IT HAS PERSONNEL CARRIERS, IT HAS AIR DEFENSE GUNS, IT HAS VERY REDUNDANT, RESILIENT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT OPERATING ECHELONS OF THE ARMY. IT HAS STOCKAGES OF FOOD, AMMUNITION, AND PARTS WITH THE ARMY IN THEATER, AND THEY HAVE A VERY ELABORATE SUPPLY SYSTEM COMING DOWN FROM THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY TO SUSTAIN THAT ARMY. OUR STRATEGY TO GO AFTER THIS ARMY IS VERY, VERY SIMPLE. FIRST, WE'RE GOING TO CUT IT OFF, AND THEN WE'RE GOING TO KILL IT. TO

CUT IT OFF ., THAT BEGAN LAST WEEK WHEN WE STARTED TO GO AFTER THE NERVE CENTER, THE BRAINS OF THE OPERATION, THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE OPERATION, AND THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION THAT COME OUT OF BAGHDAD AND OTHER PLACES IN THE COUNTRY, FLOWING DOWN THE TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES VALLEYS, DOWN THESE LINES OF COMMUNICATION, TO TRY TO SUPPORT SOMEWHERE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF A HALF A MILLION MEN DOWN HERE IN THE KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS. ALL WE HAVE BEEN DOING TO GAIN CONTROL OVER HERE, TO BEGIN SEVERING THIS AND TRY TO DEADEN THE NERVE ENDINGS UP HERE, ALL GOES BACK TO OUR ORIGINAL MILITARY OBJECTIVE .- TO GET RID OF THE ARMY THAT IS IN KUWAIT.

NOW THAT THAT HAS STARTED, WE WILL INTENSIFY THIS CUTTING OFF PROCESS, GO AFTER THE LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AS THEY ENTER THE VICINITY OF BASRAH, AND AS THEY COME OUT OF BASRAH GOING DOWN TO THE ARMY. GOING AFTER THE COMMAND CONTROL MEANS, THE MEANS BY WHICH THEY EXERCISE COMMAND AND CONTROL OVER THAT FORCE IN THE THEATER. GOING AFTER MOBILITY, TRUCKS THAT MOVE SUPPLIES FORWARD. ANYTHING THAT ALLOWS THAT ARMY TO FUNCTION, WE WILL NOW GO AFTER. AS WE GET INTO THE PROCESS OF CUTTING IT OFF, WE WILL ALSO STEP UP THE PROCESS OF KILLING IT, BY GOING AFTER STOCK-PILES, AMMUNITION, FOOD, STRIPPING AWAY THEIR GUN AIR DEFENSE, USING AIR ATTACKS, AND IF IT BECOMES NECESSARY, WE ARE ASSEMBLING A FAIRLY SIZEABLE GROUND FORCE THAT COULD FINISH OFF THE JOB, SHOULD THAT BE NECESSARY. I ALSO WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT WE HAVE QUITE A CAPABILITY AT SEA WITH NAVAL GUNFIRE, WITH NAVAL AVIATION, AS WELL AS QUITE A FORMIDABLE AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY WITH OUR MARINE FORCES -, AND AS SOME OF YOU KNOW, OUR TWO MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADES ARE CONDUCTING PRACTICE OPERATIONS TODAY. I'M NOT TELEGRAPHING ANYTHING. I JUST WANT EVERYBODY TO KNOW THAT WE HAVE A TOOL BOX THAT'S FULL OF LOTS OF TOOLS, AND I BROUGHT THEM ALL TO THE PARTY. GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF HAS THEM ALL AT THE PARTY.

SO HOW ARE WE DOING WITH RESPECT TO THAT MAJOR OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE ., THE IRAQI ARMY IN KUWAIT? WE ARE REALLY STARTING IN EARNEST. I HAVE TO MAKE A POINT TO YOU, THAT ASSESSING THE DAMAGE ON A DEPLOYED ARMY IN THE FIELD IS QUITE A DIFFERENT PROPOSITION FROM ASSESSING THE DAMAGE ON A BUILDING THAT YOU'VE JUST HIT. YOU'VE SEEN SOME GREAT FILM FOOTAGE OF A LASER-GUIDED BOMB GOING DOWN THE VENT SHAFT OF A BUILDING. BOOM, IT BLOWS UP, IT BURNS DOWN, THERE YOU HAVE IT. IT DOESN'T WORK THAT WAY WHEN YOU HAVE A DEPLOYED ARMORED BRIGADE IN THE FIELD. THEY'RE SPREAD OUT, THEY'RE DUG IN, THEY'RE HIDING .- THEY'RE NOT STANDING OUT THERE LIKE A BUILDING. THEY'RE AVOIDING AIR ATTACK. THEY ARE GOING TO PUT OUT DUMMIES TO TRY TO DECEIVE YOU AS TO THEIR EXACT LOCATIONS. THEY'RE GOING TO PUT IN PRIMARY POSITIONS AND ALTERNATE POSITIONS AND SUPPLEMENTARY POSITIONS. THEY'RE GOING TO DIG IN THEIR LINES OF COMMUNICATION. THEY'RE GOING TO PUT IN OVERHEAD COVER. THOSE TANKS ARE DESIGNED NOT TO BE EASILY DESTROYED. SO GOING AFTER THAT KIND OF UNIT IS A MUCH MORE DIFFICULT PROPOSITION, BUT THEY ARE VULNERABLE. THERE'S NO QUESTION ABOUT IT. WE ARE NOW TURNING OUR ATTENTION AND SELECTING MUNITIONS, AND SELECTING TARGET PACKAGES TO GO AFTER THAT ARMY WHICH, IN EFFECT, IS SITTING OUT THERE NOT DOING ANYTHING. IT HAS NOT MOVED SINCE THE OPERATION BEGAN. THERE HAS BEEN NO MAJOR, IN FACT THERE BEEN NO MINOR SHIFTS OF UNITS AROUND. IT IS, FOR THE MOST PART, SITTING THERE, DUG IN, WAITING TO BE ATTACKED, AND ATTACKED IT

WILL BE. BUT IT IS ALSO SITTING THERE WITHOUT AIR SUPPORT, WITHOUT ANYTHING TO KEEP THE ATTACK FROM BEING PROSECUTED AGAINST THEM, AND WITH EACH PASSING DAY, WITH A REDUCED ABILITY TO BRING IN LOGISTICS DOWN THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THIS LARGE FORCE WILL BECOME WEAKER EVERY DAY, - THAT'S ABSOLUTELY MATHEMATICAL. WE'RE GOING TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO MAKE SURE THAT ARMY CANNOT BE REINFORCED WITH NEW TROOPS, AND OVER TIME, THEY WILL HAVE INCREASING DIFFICULTY TO RESUPPLY IT. YET THAT ARMY HAS GOOD SOLDIERS. THE UNITS ARE OF VARYING QUALITY. THE REPUBLICAN GUARD, AS WE'VE SAID MANY TIMES, IS QUITE GOOD. OTHER PARTS OF THE FORCE ARE NOT QUITE SO GOOD. WE HAVE ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE OF SOME LOW MORALE, AND ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE OF SOME DEFECTIONS, BUT IT IS NOT A TREND YET. WE HAVE STARTED TO GET SOME BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT ON THE REPUBLICAN GUARD UNITS THAT WE'VE BEEN STRIKING. IN SOME CASES, THE ANALYSTS WHO LOOK AT THESE PHOTOS, AND I LOOK AT THEM AS WELL, - TELL ME, YOU SEE THAT UNIT OUT THERE? IT'S TAKEN ABOUT 40 PERCENT DAMAGE. I CAN'T TELL THAT, YOU'VE GOT TO BE AN EXPERT. BUT THERE IS DAMAGE TAKING PLACE. OTHER UNITS THAT WE HAVE HIT, WE'VE LOOKED AT THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND SAID WE DIDN'T GET A GOOD HIT ON THAT, THEY'RE JUST TOO DISPERSED, WE'VE GOT TO GO BACK AND DO IT AGAIN, VERY LIGHT DAMAGE AGAINST THAT UNIT. SO YOU ARE NOT GOING TO GET, AND WE WILL BE UNABLE TO GIVE YOU, THE KIND OF RAPIDLY MOVING AND ADJUSTING SCORE CARD ON HOW WE'RE DOING AGAINST THAT ARMY FOR SOME TIME.

YOU REALLY DON'T KNOW HOW YOU'RE DOING AGAINST AN ARMY UNTIL THAT ARMY TRIES TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTION. IF IT'S JUST SITTING THERE TAKING THE PUNISHMENT, WE KNOW WE'RE HURTING IT. WE REALLY DON'T KNOW HOW BADLY WE'VE HURT IT UNTIL IT STARTS TO MOVE, UNTIL IT COMES UP ON THE RADIO SO WE CAN HEAR IT TALKING TO OTHER UNITS, UNTIL WE CAN SEE DEFECTIONS COME OUT OF IT, OR IF IT'S NECESSARY TO GO IN AND FIGHT IT. SO WE ARE SEEING SOME ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE, BUT THE BDA IS STILL OUT ON THAT, AND WE REALLY HAVE ONLY BEGUN TO DO THE JOB ON IT.

I'D LIKE TO CLOSE BY SAYING A FEW WORDS ABOUT SOME OF THE STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN TARGETS WE HAD UP HERE. FIRST, LET ME JUST MAKE ONE POINT ON THIS SLIDE THAT I FORGOT EARLIER. AS A MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS OF HOW WE'RE DOING IN THE AIR CAMPAIGN, I JUST PULL THESE TWO THINGS OUT, - I'VE LAUNDERED THEM SO YOU CAN'T REALLY TELL WHAT I'M TALKING ABOUT BECAUSE I DON'T WANT THE IRAQIS TO KNOW WHAT I'M TALKING ABOUT, BUT TRUST ME. (LAUGHTER)

THIS REFLECTS AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE OF ELECTRONIC EMISSIONS OUT OF THE IRAQI RADAR SYSTEM. IT SHOWS THAT EARLY IN DECEMBER AND THROUGH DECEMBER THEY WERE OPERATING ABOUT OVER HERE WITH SAM, AAA RADARS, AND EARLY WARNING RADARS. ON THE 17TH OF JANUARY, AS YOU WOULD EXPECT, IT PEAKED UP TO HERE. OVER THE LAST WEEK, IT HAS COME DOWN TO HERE. THIS REPRESENTS WELL OVER A 95 PERCENT REDUCTION. NOW IT'S A COMBINATION OF DAMAGE WE HAVE DONE, AS WELL AS, I SUSPECT, CLEVER OPERATIONAL SECURITY TECHNIQUES ON THEIR PART, TO KEEP US FROM KNOWING EXACTLY WHAT'S GOING ON OR HOW BADLY THEY HAVE BEEN DAMAGED. I AM ALSO SURE THEY ARE TRYING TO WORK AROUND AND RECONSTITUTE CAPABILITY SO THEY CAN GET BACK UP. SO I DON'T WANT TO OVERSTATE IT, JUST TO GIVE YOU A MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS AND LET YOU KNOW THIS IS HOW WE TRY TO

MEASURE WHAT'S GOING ON OUT THERE.

THIS ALSO IS, BY ANOTHER MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS -- AND I'M SORRY FOR THIS BEING SO SMALL. WE JUST FINISHED IT -- SHOWS YOU THEIR DAILY SORTIE RATE. THIS WAS BEFORE THE ACTION BEGAN. ON THE 30TH OF DECEMBER THEY WERE RUNNING ABOUT 235 SORTIES A DAY DURING THAT PERIOD. IF WEATHER WAS BAD EARLY IN DECEMBER, A LITTLE LOWER. BUT JUST AS A BENCHMARK, 235 SORTIES. THE DAY OF THE WAR, THEY RAN 115 SORTIES; AND FOR THE LAST COUPLE OF DAYS THEY'VE BEEN RUNNING 31-40 SORTIES. ONCE AGAIN, THE KIND OF MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS THAT IS MORE USEFUL TO US THAN IS HOW MANY SORTIES WE FLEW OR HOW MANY BOMBS WE DROPPED, ETCETERA. A COUPLE OF THINGS ABOUT SPECIFIC CAMPAIGN TARGETS THAT REALLY GO TO THE ISSUE OF HOW TO MAKE SURE THAT WHEN THIS IS ALL OVER, THE KIND OF THREAT THAT HAS EXISTED IN THE REGION IS QUITE DIFFERENT THAN THE THREAT THAT EXISTED BEFORE IT BEGAN. FIRST, WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE HAVE TARGETED THAT NUCLEAR FACILITY THEY HAVE VERY CAREFULLY. I HAVE LOOKED AT THE BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT MYSELF WITH TRAINED ANALYSTS, AND I THINK I CAN CONFIRM FOR YOU THAT THE TWO OPERATING REACTORS THEY HAD ARE BOTH GONE, THEY'RE DOWN, THEY'RE FINISHED. THE ONE THAT THE ISRAELIS TOOK CARE OF SOME YEARS AGO, REMAINS DOWN.

WITH RESPECT TO CHEMICAL FACILITIES, -- THE FOCUS OF OUR EFFORT FOR THE FIRST WEEK HAS BEEN ON THEIR PRODUCTION CAPABILITY AND THEIR ABILITY TO FILL MUNITIONS. THERE ARE HUNDREDS OF BUNKERS OUT THERE, AND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A WASTE OF OUR EFFORT TO KEEP CHASING EVERY SINGLE BUNKER WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE CHEMICAL WEAPONS STORED IN THEM, BECAUSE THEY HAVE DISPERSED A LOT OF THAT CHEMICAL WEAPON CAPABILITY THEY HAVE OUT TO OPERATING UNITS. SO WE CONCENTRATED ON PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND THE FACILITIES THAT THEY USE TO PUT THE MATERIAL INTO ACTUAL WEAPONS TO BE DELIVERED. WE HAVE HAD QUITE A BIT OF SUCCESS, AND WITHOUT GETTING INTO SPECIFICS, I THINK I CAN SAY THAT WE HAVE DONE CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO THEIR ABILITY TO CONTINUE PRODUCING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. BUT THEY STILL HAVE A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY. THEIR ARTILLERY CAN FIRE CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THEIR MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM, THEIR FREE ROCKET OVER GROUND SYSTEMS, AND THEIR AIR FORCE DOES HAVE THAT CAPABILITY, SO IT'S STILL A THREAT TO ALLIED FORCES IN THE REGION.

WITH RESPECT TO THEIR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE FACILITIES, WE HAVE GONE AFTER THOSE AND HAVE CREATED QUITE A PROBLEM FOR THEM, I THINK. WE HAVE SERIOUSLY DAMAGED THESE FACILITIES. THERE WAS A STORY EARLIER TODAY ABOUT THE INFANT FORMULA FACTORY. IT IS NOT AN INFANT FORMULA FACTORY, NO MORE THAN THE RABTA CHEMICAL PLANT IN LIBYA MADE ASPIRIN. IT WAS A BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS FACILITY, OF THAT WE ARE SURE --, AND WE HAVE TAKEN IT OUT. WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK OUT ANY OTHER FACILITIES THAT WE BELIEVE ARE INVOLVED IN THE PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

WITH RESPECT TO THEIR NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY AND THEIR COMM. AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, THEY ARE VERY GOOD AT THIS. THEY HAVE REDUNDANT SYSTEMS, RESILIENT SYSTEMS, THEY HAVE WORK-AROUNDS, THEY HAVE ALTERNATIVES, AND THEY ARE STILL ABLE TO COMMAND THEIR FORCES. THEY HAVE NOT LOST COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THEIR FORCES OR OF THE COUNTRY; BUT THEY ARE DOING IT WITHOUT BENEFIT OF THEIR MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, THEIR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE CENTER, THEIR MAIN COMMUNICATIONS NODES, AND THEY'RE DOING IT, FOR THE MC LINK BLK: 965 PART, ON GENERATOR POWER, BECAUSE WE HAVE TAKEN CARE OF THE CENTRAL POWER SYSTEM WITHIN THE CITY. HE STILL DOES RETAIN THE ABILITY TO COMMAND AND CONTROL.

WE ARE ALSO NOW TURNING OUR ATTENTION INCREASINGLY TO MILITARY PRODUCTION FACILITIES --, HOW HE MAKES BOMBS, HOW HE MAKES WEAPONS, HOW HE MAKES REPAIR PARTS. THIS IS A TARGET CATEGORY THAT WE WILL GO AFTER AT OUR LEISURE OVER TIME. WE'RE IN NO HURRY. WE DON'T WANT TO WASTE SORTIES ON THINGS THAT ARE FURTHER DOWN THE PRIORITY LIST IF WE CAN GET TO THEM FURTHER DOWN THE PRIORITY LIST.

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM WE HAVE RIGHT NOW ARE THE SCUDS --, THERE'S NO DOUBT ABOUT IT. WHEN YOU THINK OF WHAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS DONE FOR THE PAST WEEK, HE HAS NOT THROWN A SINGLE MILITARY PUNCH BACK AT US. WHAT HE HAS DONE IS USED THIS WEAPON OF TERROR, THE SCUDS, AS WAS MENTIONED EARLIER BY THE SECRETARY, TO GO AFTER POPULATIONS, TO GO AFTER CITIES. WHY? AS A WEAPON OF TERROR TO TRY TO EXPAND THE CONFLICT. TO TRY TO DRAW IN THE ISRAELIS -- AND I MUST SAY, I'M EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE RESTRAINT THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN SO FAR, BUT IT IS A VEXING PROBLEM. THEY ARE MOBILE SYSTEMS. SOME OF THEM ARE VERY SOPHISTICATED SOVIET MOBILE SYSTEMS -- OTHERS ARE NOTHING MORE THAN A FLAT BED TRUCK WITH A RAIL ON IT THAT THEY'VE LOCALLY FABRICATED. WE ONLY HAVE ESTIMATES OF HOW MANY OF THESE WEAPONS THEY HAVE, BUT WE HAVE MADE IT A HIGH PRIORITY TO LOCATE THESE WEAPONS AND TO GO AFTER THEM, AND A SIGNIFICANT PART OF OUR CAPABILITY IS DIRECTED TOWARD THAT SCUD FACILITY -- THOSE SCUD FACILITIES AND MOBILE SCUDS.

I KNOW THERE'S BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IN BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. I WISH I COULD SHOW YOU THE PHOTOGRAPHS THAT WE HAVE ACCESS TO, BUT BECAUSE OF SOURCES AND METHODS, AND BECAUSE WE ARE IN AN ONGOING OPERATION, AND BECAUSE WE DO NOT WANT AN ENEMY TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT OUR REAL CAPABILITIES ARE, WE CANNOT SHOW YOU THOSE PHOTOGRAPHS. WHAT I HAVE DONE, INSTEAD, IS I HAVE MADE SOME LINE DRAWINGS, HAD SOME LINE DRAWINGS MADE. THEY'RE RATHER CRUDE. THEY'RE KIND OF CARTOONISH, BUT I JUST WANT TO GIVE YOU A SENSE OF WHAT OUR ANALYSTS LOOK AT. I WILL ASSURE YOU, THAT WHAT I'M ABOUT TO SHOW YOU COMES DIRECTLY FROM THE ACTUAL IMAGERY, BUT WE HAVE, OBVIOUSLY, DONE IT IN A WAY THAT IT DOES NOT GIVE AWAY ANY OF OUR CAPABILITY.

THIS WAS A LARGE PRODUCTION FACILITY, PART OF HIS MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE. IT WAS STRUCK BY PRECISION WEAPONS IN THE FIRST COUPLE OF DAYS OF THE OPERATION. THIS IS A VERY ACCURATE REFLECTION OF WHAT THE THING LOOKS LIKE -- TOTAL DESTRUCTION. THE POINT I WANT TO MAKE IS, OUR ANALYSTS CAN SEE THIS TO THIS LEVEL OF DETAIL AND GIVE US HIGH ASSURANCE THAT THIS PLACE HAS BEEN DESTROYED.

Q: WERE THERE WEAPONS PRODUCED THERE AT ALL?

A: IT WAS AN UNCONVENTIONAL PRODUCTION FACILITY.

HERE IS AN EXAMPLE OF A BUNKER COMPLEX, AND IT'S A CASE WHERE WE WENT AFTER SELECTED BUILDINGS. THESE TWO WERE REVETTED, THEY HAD BARRIERS AROUND THEM. WE WENT AFTER THESE WITH PRECISION WEAPONS. I THINK THIS ONE WAS DONE OVER A PERIOD OF A COUPLE OF DAYS. YOU GO STRIKE IT, YOU GET AN ASSESSMENT BACK OF THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE YOU HAVE INFLICTED ON THE FACILITY, YOU GO BACK AND STRIKE IT AGAIN. THIS HAS RECEIVED ENOUGH DAMAGE THAT I WOULD SUSPECT THAT THE TARGETEERS OVER IN CENTAF ARE NOT GOING TO WASTE

A SORTIE AT THIS TIME GOING BACK AND TAKING CARE OF THIS LAST REMAINING BUILDING. THESE WERE THE KEY ONES. THESE THREE FED INTO WHAT WAS HAPPENING AT THESE TWO FACILITIES, SO WE HAVE ESSENTIALLY DESTROYED THIS, EVEN THOUGH THERE MIGHT STILL BE A BUILDING STANDING. I'M JUST USING IT AS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE PROCESS WHICH OUR BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT PEOPLE GO THROUGH. THIS NEXT ONE IS A CASE WHERE INITIALLY WE WENT IN, DESTROYED, - HERE'S THE BUNKER COMPLEX, DESTROYED THIS BUNKER. THIS ONE WAS HIT ONCE, AND WE HAD TO GO BACK AND DO IT AGAIN TO GET THE LEVEL OF DAMAGE WE NEEDED. THIS ONE WAS ALSO STRUCK. AS THE ANALYST LOOKS AT IT, PART OF IT IS STILL INTACT -- THE TOP. THIS PART, THE LOWER PART HAS BEEN BLOWN THROUGH, BUT SINCE THE ANALYST CAN'T SEE WHAT HAPPENED UNDER THE PART THAT STILL HAS A ROOF OVER IT, HE WILL NOT DECLARE THIS DESTROYED. THEY TEND TO ERR ON THE CONSERVATIVE SIDE. THIS ONE IS COMPLETELY UNDAAMAGED, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO NEED TO WASTE A SORTIE OR RISK A PILOT GOING AGAINST THAT ONE. WE KNEW WHAT WE WERE LOOKING FOR IN THIS COMPLEX, SO WE ARE SATISFIED WITH THIS TARGET -- EVEN IF SOMEBODY WERE TO COME ALONG AND SAY AHA, YOU ONLY GOT 75 PERCENT OR 90 PERCENT, BECAUSE THIS ONE IS STILL THERE. WE DIDN'T NEED TO HIT THAT ONE. IT HAS NO RELEVANCE TO THE REST OF THE FACILITY. THIS IS AN EXAMPLE WHICH I'D LIKE TO PUT UP, FOR MY BRITISH COLLEAGUES. ONE OF THE THINGS WE DID EARLY ON TO DEAL WITH THE AIRFIELDS, AND TO KEEP THE AIR FORCE ON THE GROUND, WAS TO ESSENTIALLY INTERDICT THE AIRFIELDS SO THEY COULDN'T BE USED. WE COULD DO THAT VERY QUICKLY BY TRYING TO CRATER THE RUNWAYS. IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, THIS SHOWS A BRITISH WEAPON SYSTEM, WHICH I THINK WAS BRIEFED EARLIER OUT OF RIYADH, I BELIEVE, BY A BRITISH OFFICER, BUT IT'S A JP,233, WHICH GOES ACROSS THE RUNWAY AND IS VERY EFFECTIVE AT CUTTING CONCRETE. IT WILL CUT UP THE CONCRETE AND BREAK IT UP SO THAT THE AIRFIELD CANNOT BE USED FOR SOME PERIOD OF HOURS, AND I DON'T WANT TO GET INTO HOW LONG THAT MIGHT BE -- IT DEPENDS ON THE AIRFIELD, DEPENDS ON THE KIND OF CONCRETE, DEPENDS ON THE KIND OF CUT THAT'S MADE. YOU WOULD USE THIS WEAPON SYSTEM AND OTHER WEAPON SYSTEMS THAT WE HAVE, TO TRY AND CUT THIS AIRFIELD IN A NUMBER OF PLACES TO KEEP IT FROM BEING USED FOR AWHILE. THEN WE CAN COME BACK TO IT AT OUR LEISURE AND TAKE CARE OF WHAT IS ON THAT AIRFIELD. IN THIS CASE, THE PILOT ELECTED TO CUT THESE TAXIWAYS HERE SO THAT THE AIRCRAFT IN THESE HARDENED AIRCRAFT SHELTERS COULD NOT GET OUT TO THE ACTIVE RUNWAY TO TAKE OFF. LET ME CONCLUDE THERE BY SAYING, AS THE SECRETARY SAID, I'M SATISFIED WITH THE CAMPAIGN. WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO TELL EVERYBODY IN THE BEGINNING THAT WE WOULD DO IT IN TIME, AND DO IT AS SMARTLY AS WE CAN. WE'RE IN NO HURRY. WE ARE NOT LOOKING TO HAVE LARGE NUMBERS OF CASUALTIES, BUT IT IS AN INTEGRATED CAMPAIGN -- EACH PART OF THE CAMPAIGN BEARING SOME RELATIONSHIP TO THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF EJECTING THE IRAQI ARMY FROM KUWAIT. THANK YOU. Q: MR. SECRETARY, GIVEN WHAT YOU'VE TOLD US TODAY, CAN YOU TELL US IF YOU THINK THAT THE SCUD SEARCH HAS HAD ANY EFFECT ON THE CAMPAIGN? AND IF YOU DO BELIEVE WHAT SUCCESS RATES YOU'VE HAD HERE, THEN DOES THAT MEAN YOU'RE ABLE TO GO ON A LITTLE BIT MORE QUICKLY TO SOME OF THE PHASES EARLIER THAN YOU MIGHT HAVE THOUGHT WHEN THIS ALL STARTED? CHENEY: THE SCUD SEARCH HAS BEEN IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT HAS NOT ONLY THE PROBLEM OF HIS BEING ABLE TO LAUNCH AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA OR ISRAEL, BUT OBVIOUSLY, THERE ARE MAJOR POLICY QUESTIONS. MAJOR

POLITICAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE ISSUE OF HOW YOU DEAL WITH THE SCUD PROBLEM, BECAUSE OF COURSE, AS THE CHAIRMAN MENTIONED, WE'VE BEEN PLEASED; AS THE PRESIDENT SAID, THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE RESTRAINED THEMSELVES UP UNTIL NOW AND NOT RETALIATED AND GOTTEN INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT, BUT THAT'S A DELICATE PROPOSITION. OUR ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE SCUD THREAT MAKES IT EASIER FOR US TO DEAL WITH THE BROADER POLICY

QUESTIONS THAT ARE INVOLVED. IT'S A QUESTION OF DIVERTING RESOURCES AND DECIDING HOW MUCH YOU'RE GOING TO PUT AGAINST THE SCUD PROBLEMS ITSELF.

Q: HAS THAT CREATED A PROBLEM AT ALL, FOR THE REST OF...

CHENEY: I WOULDN'T SAY IT'S CREATED A PROBLEM IN THAT SENSE. I THINK IT WOULD BE FAIR TO SAY THAT THE SYSTEMS THAT ARE FOCUSED ON DEALING WITH THE SCUD THREAT ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO DEAL WITH OTHER THREATS, BUT WE ALWAYS KNEW WE WERE GOING TO HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE SCUD THREAT, WE ALWAYS KNEW THAT WAS A POTENTIAL PROBLEM. WE'VE ASSUMED HE MAY HAVE CHEMICAL WARHEADS TO GO ON THE SCUDS, SO UNTIL WE'VE GOT A HIGH DEGREE OF ASSURANCE THAT WE'VE DEALT WITH THAT PROBLEM, WE WILL CONTINUE TO DEVOTE RESOURCES TO IT.

Q: YOU SAID THE CAMPAIGN IS GOING VERY WELL. THE FIRST THING YOU CITED WAS THE AIR SUPERIORITY. DO YOU REALLY FEEL THAT YOU WERE REALLY CHALLENGED BY THE IRAQI ARMY, NUMBER ONE? YOU SAID THEY REALLY HAVE BEEN IN THE BUNKERS. NUMBER TWO, YOU TALKED ABOUT COMMAND AND CONTROL EACH DAY, BUT THERE ARE MANY REPORTS SAYING THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN IS FOUR STORIES BELOW, UNDERNEATH THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, AND FERRYING BETWEEN THE DEFENSE MINISTRY. NUMBER THREE, YOU TALKED ABOUT TAKING OUT THE NUCLEAR SITES, BUT MANY PEOPLE THOUGHT EARLY ON THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE A LONG-TERM THREAT. SO DO YOU FEEL THAT POSSIBLY YOU COULD BE OVERLY PRE-
DICTING A ROSY TYPE OF OUTCOME IN LIGHT OF THIS?

CHENEY: I TRIED IN MY REMARKS TOWARDS THE CLOSE TO FOCUS ON THE FACT THAT WE HAVE TO ANTICIPATE THERE WILL BE ADDITIONAL SURPRISES. YOU CAN BY NO MEANS COUNT HIM OUT YET, GIVEN THE SIZE OF THE FORCE HE HAS, THAT HE COULD TRY TO FIND SOME WAY TO SURGE HIS AIR FORCE ALL AT ONCE, OR GO AFTER TARGETS THAT HE'S NOT GONE AFTER YET. AS THE CHAIRMAN MENTIONED, WE HAVEN'T REALLY SEEN ANY AGGRESSIVE MILITARY RESPONSE BY HIM TO DATE. HE'S BASICALLY COME TO GROUND AND HUNKERED DOWN. THE ONLY SAFE ASSUMPTION FOR US TO MAKE, ESPECIALLY WHEN WE'RE TALKING TO THE PRESS, IS BE CAUTIOUS HERE. WE'RE TRYING TO BE CAUTIOUS, AND NO ONE WANTS TO DECLARE THAT HE NO LONGER CONSTITUTES A THREAT. THAT WOULD BE A VERY SERIOUS MISTAKE.

Q: DO YOU THINK THIS COULD BE A STRATEGY, AS MANY MILITARY ANALYSTS BELIEVE, TO INFLICT MAXIMUM CASUALTIES?

CHENEY: IT COULD WELL BE A STRATEGY, AND BASED IN PART UPON THE FACT THAT HE HAS NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO FIND A WAY TO DEAL WITH OUR CAPABILITIES.

Q: YOU MENTIONED, GENERAL POWELL MENTIONED TWO TIMES, SOVIET AIR DEFENSES, SOVIET SCUD MISSILES. HOW MUCH MILITARY COOPERATION ARE YOU GETTING FROM THE SOVIET UNION IN DEALING WITH THIS?

CHENEY: I HAD GENERAL DISCUSSIONS WHEN I WAS IN MOSCOW, IN OCTOBER, IN A MEETING WITH SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIALS AND MARSHAL YAZOV, ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE GULF. I THINK IT WOULD BE FAIR

TO SAY THAT IT WAS THEIR VIEW THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN DID NOT POSSESS ANY SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY THAT WE WERE UNAWARE OF. THEY DESCRIBED THE SYSTEMS THAT THEY HAD PROVIDED TO HIM AS SYSTEMS THAT WERE GENERALLY AVAILABLE --, LIKE T.72 TANKS --, TO THEIR ALLIES; SPECIFICALLY WE TALKED ABOUT THE SCUD. HE MADE IT CLEAR THEN THAT THERE WAS NO GUIDANCE SYSTEM FOR THE SCUD. IT'S JUST A BALLISTIC MISSILE THAT GOES WHEREVER IT GOES. IT'S NOT A HIGHLY ACCURATE OR VERY SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM.

I THINK PROBABLY THE GREATEST TWO CONTRIBUTIONS THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE TO THIS VENTURE -- ONE HAS BEEN THEIR COOPERATION AND SUPPORT OF THE POLICY IN THE UNITED NATIONS, WHICH HAVE BEEN VERY SIGNIFICANT; AND THE OTHER IS THAT THEY HAVE SHUT OFF THE FLOW OF ARMS EXPORTS TO IRAQ. THE SITUATION WE'RE FACED WITH TODAY WOULD BE FAR MORE DIFFICULT IF SADDAM HUSSEIN WERE ABLE TO GET RESUPPLIED IN TERMS OF THE KEY PIECES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT THAT WE'VE BEEN WORKING TO DESTROY.

Q: SIR, HOW EFFECTIVE HAVE THE IRAQIS BEEN AT REPAIRING THE DAMAGE TO THEIR AIRFIELDS AND OTHER TARGETS? AND HOW EFFECTIVE HAVE THEY BEEN AT FOOLING YOU WITH DECOYS IN THEIR SCUD MISSILE DEPARTMENT?

POWELL: THEY USE DECOYS. THEY'RE QUITE GOOD AT IT. I'LL LET THE CHART I USED EARLIER AS TO WHICH AIRFIELDS ARE ACTIVE, SPEAK FOR ITSELF. THEY, OBVIOUSLY, ARE HARD AT WORK REPAIRING SOME OF THE DAMAGE -- WE'VE SEEN IT. WE'VE ALSO SEEN THEM PAINT DAMAGE ON AIRFIELDS TO SPOOF US INTO THINKING THAT IT IS STILL DAMAGED, AND THEREFORE WE DON'T HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT IT. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO PUT OUT DUMMY SCUD SYSTEMS. THIS ISN'T A SURPRISE TO US, BECAUSE THEY HAVE A LONG HISTORY, AND DID IT THROUGHOUT THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, OF USING DUMMIES IN ORDER TO CONFUSE THEIR ENEMY. THEY PROBABLY ARE ALSO MAKING SOME EFFORTS TO TAKE TOTALLY DESTROYED FACILITIES AND COVER THEM OVER QUICKLY, TO MAKE THEM APPEAR AS IF THEY'RE NOT TOTALLY DESTROYED, TO LURE US INTO COMING BACK. BUT I THINK OUR ANALYSTS AND OUR TARGETEERS ARE QUITE SOPHISTICATED -- THEY'RE THE BEST IN THE WORLD -- AND THEY WILL BE SENSITIVE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF DUMMY INSTALLATIONS AND FALSE REPAIRS.

Q: ON THE AIR POWER QUESTION: YOU'VE INDICATED 19 KILLED IN AIR COMBAT MANEUVERS OR, IF YOU WOULD, DOG FIGHTS; ANOTHER 22 ON THE GROUND -- OR AT LEAST THAT WAS THE INFERENCE I GOT.

POWELL: IT'S A NUMBER THAT CHANGES EVERY FEW HOURS AS WE GET BDA ASSESSMENT. WE GOT THREE MORE JUST AS WE WALKED IN, SOME BADGERS THAT HAD BEEN DESTROYED ON THE GROUND.

Q: WE'RE TALKING ABOUT ROUGHLY 30 AIRCRAFT GONE, IF WE ASSUME THAT. IT STILL LEAVES ROUGHLY 750 LEFT.

POWELL: CORRECT.

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY INDICATION THE IRAQIS ARE DOING A MOVE-AND-HIDE STRATEGY, PERHAPS IN SOME OF THESE DISPERSAL FIELDS THAT THERE WAS DAMAGE DONE, BUT THEY STILL HAVE SUPPORT FACILITIES THERE TO OPERATE AIR POWER? IS THAT CONCERNING YOU -- ESPECIALLY SINCE IF THEY REBUILD, THEY COULD PUT UP A MASS WAVE OF 200, 300, 400 AIRCRAFT ALL OF A SUDDEN.

POWELL: I ATTRIBUTE THAT CAPABILITY TO THEM. IN ADDITION TO THE FACILITIES YOU SAW ON THAT MAP THEY ARE PROBABLY USING HIGHWAYS AND OTHER THINGS LIKE THAT. SO WE ASSUME THEY HAVE THAT CAPABILITY. THEY DID NOT USE IT IN THE FIRST SEVEN DAYS OF THE WAR; THEY DID NOT CHALLENGE US WITH DEFENSIVE AIR; THEY HAVE NOT TRIED TO ATTACK US WITH OFFENSIVE AIR -- BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE ARE NOT ON THE LOOKOUT FOR IT, OR WE'RE NOT ALERT TO IT, OR WE

ARE UNMINDFUL OF THE THREAT IT REPRESENTS. IT DOES REPRESENT A THREAT, BUT IT'S A THREAT WE UNDERSTAND. WE BELIEVE WE ARE QUITE ABLE TO DEAL WITH, AND RATHER THAN SPEND AIR POWER NOW TRYING TO RUN THE BODY COUNT UP ON AIRPLANES THAT ARE NOT BOTHERING US AT THE MOMENT, I'D RATHER USE THAT AIR POWER IN MORE EFFICIENT WAYS AGAINST THINGS THAT ARE OF MORE IMMEDIATE RELEVANCE TO OUR BATTLE PLAN.

Q: THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS THAT AT LEAST ONE OTHER COUNTRY IN THE AREA IS PROVIDING A SANCTUARY FOR IRAQI AIRCRAFT OR OTHER EQUIPMENT. DO YOU HAVE ANY EVIDENCE AT ALL TO SUPPORT OR...

POWELL: I'VE SEEN THOSE REPORTS, AND I CAN'T CONFIRM THEM.

Q: I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU TO EXPAND A LITTLE BIT ON WHAT YOU INFER THE IRAQI MILITARY STRATEGY TO BE. YOU SAID THEIR ACTIONS COULD BE PART OF A STRATEGY. DOES THE IRAQI MILITARY RESPONSE TO DATE, THAT IS THE ABSENCE OF A RESPONSE, SURPRISE YOU? WERE YOU SURPRISED BY THAT? DO YOU THINK IT'S AN ATTEMPT TO ENGAGE US IN A COSTLY LAND WAR? AND A RELATED QUESTION, GENERAL POWELL IMPLIED THAT WE HOPE NOT TO HAVE TO USE GROUND FORCES -- AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAID THE REPUBLICAN GUARDS WILL LIE LOW, AND THAT THE ONLY WAY WE MAY DETERMINE IF THEY SURVIVE ATTACK IS IF THEY'RE FORCED TO MOVE. DOES THAT MEAN WE'LL HAVE TO BRING IN OUR GROUND FORCES IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER WE'VE KNOCKED THEM OUT?

POWELL: I DON'T KNOW YET. THE STRATEGY RIGHT NOW, IT SEEMS TO ME, IS THEY ARE HUNKERING DOWN. IT'S OBVIOUS. THEY, I SUSPECT, AND NOT BEING AN IRAQI GENERAL, I DON'T HAVE COMPLETE INSIGHT INTO WHAT THEY MAY BE THINKING, BUT I WOULD SUSPECT THAT RIGHT NOW THEY ARE HUNKERING DOWN, AND THEY PROBABLY ARE QUESTIONING WHETHER WE CAN KEEP THIS UP FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME, AND WHETHER OR NOT THE POLITICAL WILL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT WILL BE THERE TO KEEP THIS UP FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME, AND I'M SURE THEY'RE MAKING AN ASSESSMENT DAY-BY-DAY IN WHAT THEIR LOSSES ARE, AND MAKING THEIR OWN JUDGMENT AS TO HOW LONG THEY CAN SUSTAIN THIS KIND OF PUNISHMENT.

I WOULD BE THE HAPPIEST GUY IN THE WORLD IF ONE DAY ONE BOMB GOES IN ON A REPUBLICAN GUARD UNIT AND THEY SAY THAT'S IT, WE BREAK. WE CAN'T TAKE ANY MORE, WE'RE HEADING HOME, AND THEY LEAVE -- BUT I CAN'T PLAN ON THAT. SO WHAT I'M PUTTING IN PLACE, WHAT GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF IS PUTTING IN PLACE, I SHOULD SAY, AND THE CAMPAIGN PLAN THAT GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF HAS WORKED OUT, IS TO ANTICIPATE THAT AT THE END OF THE DAY, WHEN THEY ARE SO WEAKENED THAT WE BELIEVE THE TIME IS RIGHT AND AIR POWER ALONE WON'T DO IT, WE'RE PREPARED TO TAKE THIS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION USING OTHER MEANS OF COMBAT POWER BESIDES AIR POWER. THAT'S BEEN A CONSENSUS, TENT...

Q: ...ANTICIPATED IN PLANNING THE AIR CAMPAIGN BY THE IRAQI MILITARY, A LOW, LAY-LOW STRATEGY?

POWELL: I'D RATHER NOT SAY WHAT I ANTICIPATED, BECAUSE IT MIGHT GIVE MR. HUSSEIN SOME INSIGHT ON WHAT I'M ANTICIPATING NOW.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, YOU SAID A MINUTE AGO THAT SAEDAM HUSSEIN CANNOT CHANGE THE BASIC COURSE OF THIS CONFLICT -- HE WILL BE DEFEATED. IS THERE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HE AND HIS CIRCLE OF ADVISERS BELIEVES THAT? AND WHAT ARE YOU DOING TO MAKE HIM BELIEVE THAT? AND IF YOU'RE NOT DOING ANYTHING, WHY NOT?

CHENEY: I THINK IF IT WAS DIFFICULT BEFORE THE CONFLICT STARTED TO TRY TO ASSESS SADDAM HUSSEIN'S MENTAL ATTITUDE AND HIS THINKING ABOUT ALL THESE KINDS OF ISSUES, IT'S PROBABLY EVEN MORE DIFFICULT NOW. THERE'S NO PRESS LEFT IN BAGHDAD, VERY LITTLE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION THROUGH OTHER COUNTRIES. WE KNOW LESS TODAY ABOUT WHAT'S GOING ON INSIDE SADDAM HUSSEIN'S MIND THAN WE DID THEN. SO IT WOULD BE RISKY BUSINESS FOR US, I THINK, TO MAKE JUDGMENTS ABOUT THAT.

IT MAY WELL BE THAT HE DOES NOT HAVE AS MUCH INFORMATION AS WE DO ABOUT THE IMPACT WE'VE HAD ON HIS FORCES; THAT HAVING, IN MANY CASES, DAMAGED HIS COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM AND HAD THE IMPACT THAT COLIN SHOWS WITH RESPECT TO HIS AIR CAPABILITY, ETC.. THAT HE SIMPLY DOESN'T KNOW HOW BADLY HE'S BEEN HIT. I THINK ULTIMATELY, HE'LL GET THE MESSAGE, - I WOULD HOPE THAT HE WILL. AND WE ARE DETERMINED, IN TERMS OF THE STATEMENT I MADE, TO ACHIEVE OUR MILITARY OBJECTIVE, WHICH IS TO DO WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED US TO DO, WHICH IS TO GET SADDAM HUSSEIN OUT OF KUWAIT. Q: IS PART OF THE PLAN THAT HE SHOULD NOT KNOW? WOULD YOU LIKE TO VISIT A MINIMUM LEVEL OF DESTRUCTION, FOR INSTANCE, UPON THE REPUBLICAN GUARD, BEFORE HE KNOWS IT?

CHENEY: IT'S DIFFICULT TO REFINE IT THAT CAREFULLY. ONCE YOU START MILITARY ACTION, YOU CAN GO AFTER THOSE SPECIFIC TARGETS WE'VE LAID OUT THERE, BUT WE BELIEVE THE REPUBLICAN GUARD IS AT THE HEART OF HIS MILITARY CAPABILITY AND HIS POLITICAL POWER. BUT THAT'S THE UNIT THAT HE USED TO TAKE KUWAIT, THOSE ARE THE UNITS THAT HE USED IN HIS WAR WITH IRAN FOR OFFENSIVE PURPOSES -. THEY ARE THE HEART OF THE REGIME. WE'RE NOT REALLY TRYING TO FINE TUNE IT. WE'LL HIT THE REPUBLICAN GUARD JUST AS HARD AS WE HAVE TO UNTIL WE'VE ACHIEVED OUR OBJECTIVES.

Q: WE KNOW THAT HE HAS, IN THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS, DEMONSTRATED A CAPABILITY TO PUT SALVOS OF SCUDS OVER MAJOR CITIES FROM TEL AVIV ACROSS THE AREA OF THE PERSIAN GULF. IF HE MARRIES THEM NOW WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS, POISON GAS OR OTHER, ARE WE PREPARED, AND WOULD WE, RESPOND IN KIND?

CHENEY: WE HAVE TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE MAY HAVE CHEMICAL CAPABILITY THAT HE COULD MARRY UP WITH HIS BALLISTIC MISSILES. HE'S NEVER PREVIOUSLY USED BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL WARHEADS ON THEM, BUT WE HAVE TO ASSUME HE COULD. THAT'S ONE OF THE REASONS FOR THE ELABORATE ALARM SYSTEMS WE'VE WORKED OUT -- BOTH IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE WORKED OUT; THE PROTECTIVE GEAR OUR TROOPS ARE EQUIPPED WITH, ETC.

IN TERMS OF HOW WE MIGHT RESPOND WERE HE TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS, I WOULD SIMPLY REITERATE WHAT WE'VE SAID PREVIOUSLY, WHICH IS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS A BROAD SPECTRUM OF CAPABILITIES AVAILABLE; THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD MAKE THE DECISION ABOUT HOW WE MIGHT RESPOND TO AN UNCONVENTIONAL ATTACK BY SADDAM HUSSEIN AGAINST U.S. OR ALLIED FORCES; AND I WOULDN'T WANT TO SPECULATE FURTHER.

Q: CAN I ASK YOU A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS, FIRST OF ALL, ABOUT THE REPORT OF A COUPS ATTEMPT. HAVE YOU HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT THIS AT ALL -- WITHIN IRAQ?

CHENEY: NOTHING THAT WOULD GIVE ME ANY REASON TO BELIEVE IT HAS CREDENCE.

Q: GENERAL POWELL, I HAVE ANOTHER QUESTION ABOUT THE EXOCETS WE TALKED ABOUT THE SILKWORKS BEING TAKEN OUT, BUT YOU DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING ABOUT THE EXOCETS, AND MANY PEOPLE THINK THAT'S ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON SYSTEMS HE HAS. IT WAS VERY EFFECTIVE

IN THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT. HAVE YOU DONE ANYTHING TO TAKE OUT THE EXOCETS?

POWELL: THE NAVY IS WORKING ON IT. THEY'RE OF LIMITED RANGE AND DON'T REPRESENT A VERY SERIOUS THREAT AT THE MOMENT.

Q: YOU WERE SAYING BEFORE THAT THE COALITION WOULD TAKE AS LONG AS IT HAD TO, AND YET YOU'VE OUTLINED SOME GOALS THAT LOOK LIKE THEY MIGHT LAST LONG. YOU SAID YOU WANT TO RIP UP THE AIR FORCE, YET THEY STILL HAVE SOME 750 PLANES; AND YOU SAID YOU WANTED TO SHUT UP THE ARMY WITH CUTTING OFF ITS COMMUNICATIONS, WHICH IS STILL VERY RESILIENT, A VERY LARGE ARMY; THE CHEMICAL WEAPON THREAT IS STILL A THREAT TO THE ALLIES; AND THE SCUD IS STILL A WEAPON OF TERROR FOR THE ALLIES. DOES THAT NOT SOUND LIKE IT'S GOING TO LAST SOME TIME?

CHENEY: WE'VE AVOIDED CONSISTENTLY PUTTING ANY ARTIFICIAL DEADLINE OUT THERE BY WHICH THIS WHOLE OPERATION HAD TO BE COMPLETED. WE DO NOT KNOW HOW LONG IT WILL LAST. THE KIND OF THINGS YOU MENTIONED ARE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. WE WILL OPERATE UNTIL WE'VE ACHIEVED THOSE OBJECTIVES, AND I SIMPLY WOULDN'T WANT TO PUT A TIME FRAME ON IT. I CAN'T DO THAT. I DON'T KNOW HOW LONG IT WILL TAKE. ALTHOUGH I'M INCLINED TO THINK GIVEN THE SIZE OF THE FORCE WE'VE DEPLOYED, AND THE SUCCESS WE'VE ENJOYED TO DATE, THAT IT WON'T TAKE THAT LONG.

Q: IS THE ALLIED FORCE'S PATIENCE GOING TO OUTLAST THE PATIENCE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN WHO IS HUNKERING DOWN? WHICH PATIENCE IS GOING TO OUTLAST?

CHENEY: THERE'S NO DOUBT IN MY MIND BUT WHAT THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES IN THIS VENTURE HAVE THE STAYING POWER TO SEE TO IT THAT THE JOB GETS DONE -- THAT HE WILL QUIT LONG BEFORE WE WILL.

Q: YOU'RE MENTIONING NOW THAT YOUR MAIN FOCUS IS THE REPUBLICAN GUARDS. DOES THAT MEAN AT THIS JUNCTURE IN THE AIR CAMPAIGN YOU'RE PRETTY MUCH SPARING THE TROOPS RIGHT AT THE FRONT LINE?

POWELL: NO, THEY ARE UNDER ATTACK AS WELL. WE'RE SELECTIVELY PROBING AGAINST ALL OF THE FORCES IN THE KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS, BUT BECAUSE THE REPUBLICAN GUARD IS THE REPUBLICAN GUARD, THEY GET MORE ATTENTION THAN THE REST.

Q: ON THE SCUD THREAT, WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THE SCUD LAUNCHERS WOULD YOU SAY -- MOBILE AND FIXED -- HAVE BEEN DESTROYED; AND HOW WELL ARE THE ALLIES ON THEIR WAY TOWARD DESTROYING THE FULL SCUD CAPABILITY SO THAT THE SAUDIS AND THE ISRAELIS WON'T HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT THAT?

CHENEY: I DON'T THINK YOU CAN PUT A HARD PERCENTAGE ON THE AMOUNT OF HIS CAPABILITY THAT'S BEEN DESTROYED. WE KNOW HE HAD A LARGE NUMBER OF MISSILES BEFORE THIS STARTED. THE MISSILES ARE IMPORTANT, BUT THE LAUNCHERS ARE EVEN MORE IMPORTANT. WE KNOW WE'VE BEEN ABLE TO ATTACK SUCCESSFULLY MANY OF THE FIXED SITES. WE CONTINUE TO WORK ON THOSE FIXED SITES. WE KNOW HE'S GOT MOBILE CAPABILITY, BUT WE HAVE SOME CONFIDENCE WE'VE DESTROYED SOME OF THAT MOBILE CAPABILITY. BUT IT'S A NEBULOUS KIND OF THING. THEY'RE RELATIVELY SMALL PIECES OF EQUIPMENT; THEY CAN HIDE IN THE DESERT; THEY CAN COME OUT AT NIGHT AND LAUNCH; IT DOESN'T REQUIRE ANY GREAT DEGREE OF SOPHISTICATION FOR THEM TO BE ABLE TO OPERATE. IT'S ONE OF THOSE PROBLEMS THAT MAY BE WITH US

FOR SOME PERIOD OF TIME, AND IT'S A MATTER OF REDUCING THE ODDS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, OF GOING AGGRESSIVELY AFTER HIS LAUNCH CAPABILITY, BUT ALSO DEFENDING THE TARGETS, WHICH IS WHY WE'VE DEPLOYED PATRIOT BOTH IN SAUDI ARABIA AND IN ISRAEL.

Q: WHO FIRED THE PATRIOT THAT APPARENTLY HIT OR DIDN'T HIT THE SCUD THAT DID THE DAMAGE IN TEL AVIV YESTERDAY?

POWELL: IDF. (ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE)

Q: WHY DID THEY DO IT INSTEAD OF THE U.S. CREWS?

POWELL: EITHER ONE COULD HAVE DONE IT, WHOEVER WAS IN POSITION. THE U.S. CREW WAS WORKING WITH A POWER PROBLEM, A GENERATOR PROBLEM THEY HAD AT THE TIME, AND IDF GOT ACQUISITION AND FIRED.

Q: DID THAT PATRIOT HIT THE SCUD?

POWELL: I REALLY WOULD PREFER TO DEFER TO THE IDF TO COMMENT ON THEIR ACTIONS. I'M JUST PASSING ON A REPORT I HEARD.

Q: JUST GOING BACK TO AN EARLIER LINE OF QUESTIONING, WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF THE ARGUMENT THAT IN FACT THE SADDAM HUSSEIN STRATEGY IS SIMPLY TO STRETCH THIS WAR OUT AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, FORCING THE ALLIED TROOPS INTO A LONG, BLOODY GROUND WAR -- HE'S ENJOYING SOME SUCCESS IN THAT. HOW DO YOU VIEW THAT; AND IS THERE ANYTHING YOU CAN REALLY DO IF HE CONTINUES TO HUSBAND HIS RESOURCES AS HE'S BEEN DOING?

CHENEY: I'M NOT A MILITARY STRATEGIST TO THE EXTENT THAT MY COLLEAGUE, GENERAL POWELL, MIGHT BE; BUT LOOKING AT IT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF U.S. FORCES VERSUS IRAQI FORCES, HE REALLY HASN'T GOT MUCH CHOICE AT THIS POINT. HE IS PURSUING A STRATEGY, PERHAPS OF NECESSITY. IF HE COMES UP WITH HIS AIR FORCES IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS, I THINK WE'LL SEE THE KIND OF RATIO THAT COLIN TALKED ABOUT IN TERMS OF 19-2 OR 19-1 ON HIS ENTIRE AIR FORCE, AND HE WOULD LOSE IT AND GAIN VERY LITTLE FOR IT. HE DOESN'T HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT NAVAL CAPABILITY. HE'S REALLY LEFT WITH A VERY LARGE ARMY --, THAT'S ALWAYS BEEN THE HEART OF HIS MILITARY STRENGTH, AND HIS SUCCESS IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR WAS TO DIG IN AND HUNKER DOWN AND DEFEND AGAINST THE HUMAN WAVE ASSAULTS BY IRANIAN TEENAGERS. THAT'S NOT THE KIND OF SITUATION HE'S FACED WITH TODAY.

I THINK THE REASON HE WILL NOT BE SUCCESSFUL WITH THE WAIT, IT, CUT STRATEGY, IS THAT AS LONG AS HE IS SITTING THERE WAITING, WE ARE STEADILY AND PROGRESSIVELY DESTROYING HIS UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE CAPABILITY, FINDING AND DESTROYING HIS SCUDS, TAKING OUT HIS AIR FORCE PIECE-BY-PIECE, AND NOW, AS THE CHAIRMAN POINTED OUT, AGGRESSIVELY WORKING OVER HIS GROUND FORCES IN KUWAIT. I THINK TIME IS CLEARLY ON OUR SIDE. AND GIVEN OUR DOMINANCE IN THE AIR AND OUR CAPABILITY TO DO SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE TO HIS GROUND FORCES THAT EACH DAY, EACH WEEK THAT GOES BY HE GETS WEAKER AND WE GET STRONGER.

Q: YOU STATED YOUR GOAL, THOUGH, IS TO GET HIS TROOPS OUT OF KUWAIT -- AND IN FACT, WHILE THIS PUMMELING CONTINUES, HIS TROOPS REMAIN STILL REASONABLY INTACT, WHICH SUGGESTS THAT IT'S INEVITABLE THAT HE WILL DRAW THE ALLIES INTO A GROUND WAR.

CHENEY: WE MAY EVENTUALLY, AND I'LL DEFER TO GENERAL POWELL AND GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF, THEY'LL HAVE TO COME BACK AND ADVISE ME AND THE PRESIDENT ON WHEN VARIOUS PIECES OF THE CAMPAIGN KICK IN, BUT IF WE DO HAVE TO GO TO USING OUR GROUND FORCES TO PUSH HIM OUT OF KUWAIT, IT WILL BE AFTER WE'VE DONE ENORMOUS DAMAGE TO HIS GROUND FORCES, AFTER THEY'VE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKENED. I THINK PEOPLE HAVE THE SAME CAPABILITY ON THE GROUND TO DISPLAY THE KIND OF MASTERY OVER IRAQI FORCES THAT THEY'VE DISPLAYED IN THE AIR TO DATE.

Q: THE AIRCRAFT THAT YOU'RE SHOWING US AS DESTROYED ON THE GROUND, ARE THOSE CONFIRMED WRECKAGES; OR ARE YOU INCLUDING IN THAT ANY ESTIMATE OF...

POWELL: THE ONES I'M SHOWING YOU ARE CONFIRMED. WE HAD A COUPLE MORE CONFIRMED AS WE WERE WALKING DOWN HERE. AS THE BDA GETS BETTER, AND AS THE ATTACK PROGRESSES, THAT NUMBER WILL GROW. WE'RE NOT DOING ESTIMATES. WE'RE TRYING TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS WE CAN. I'M NOT DOWN HERE TO GIVE YOU A HAPPY TALK --, I'M TRYING TO GIVE YOU MY BEST ASSESSMENT AS I KNOW IT NOW. I DON'T KNOW HOW LONG THE WAR WILL TAKE. IT'S A WAR. I DON'T THINK WE'VE DONE BADLY FOR SEVEN DAYS, AND I THINK WE'RE BY NO MEANS BGGED DOWN, AND WE'LL TRY TO GIVE YOU AS MUCH INFORMATION AS WE CAN --, AND WE'LL GIVE YOU THAT WHICH WE CAN CONFIRM. WHAT WE CAN'T DO IS TRY TO KEEP UP WITH THE HOURLY NEWS CYCLE. THAT'S CAUSING US A GREAT DEAL OF...

Q: THE MAP THAT YOU SHOWED US, IS THAT THE RADAR COVERAGE THAT THEY HAD ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE WAR, OR AS OF THREE HOURS AGO?

POWELL: IT WAS NOT PRECISE --, OBVIOUSLY, I MADE IT GENERIC FOR SECURITY PURPOSES -- BUT IT GENERALLY SHOWS THE SCHEME OF COVERAGE THAT THEY HAD ON THE FIRST DAY.

Q: HOW ABOUT COLLATERAL DAMAGE?

POWELL: I THINK WE HAVE BEEN AWFULLY GOOD IN AVOIDING COLLATERAL DAMAGE. AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF WORK WENT INTO THE TARGETING FOR THIS OPERATION. I CAN'T SAY THAT THERE WAS NO COLLATERAL DAMAGE, BUT SOME OF THE CLAIMS THAT HAVE BEEN OUT THERE THAT WE HAVE STRUCK RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL SITES, I HAVE SEEN NO HARD EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST WE DID THAT.
THANK YOU.
